LAWYERS AND JURISTS
O.F. Robinson*
Alan and I have known each other since before 1966; were it not for him I
should never have become a romanist, and indeed I was originally his
Assistant. Since then he has propounded, we have argued, I have agreed, and
disagreed. I can only describe Alan Watson as il mio padrone. I hope he
will enjoy this look at the imperial garb.
“We may be surprised, though, that such great legal
development could be due to a few jurists chosen from such a
small section of the population.”
-Watson, Law-Making1
Many books on Roman law make very similar statements. There are
questions arising from it that have been vexing me for decades. How many
jurists were there, ever? How many jurists were there at any one time? (A
critical mass is surely needed before there is acceptance by one’s peers,
before a ius commune can be created.) How many aspirants were there?
What differences were there in authority between the jurists of the Republic
and of the Empire? To find some answers I make use of the leading English
textbook on the historical background to Roman law and its legal science,2
and of the two still indispensable works on the Roman jurists.3
The methodological problems in looking for answers to these questions
are enormous. Even before we consider the nature of the available evidence,
there is the problem of terminology. Certainly in English, but it seems to me
also in the other modern European languages, there is a question begged in
the very term “jurist.” It is a noun of relatively modern construction. The
Romans themselves usually talked about iuris prudentes or iuris periti,
sometimes iuris consulti. We use jurist, whether explicitly or implicitly, to
mean someone of high reputation, and probably high status, contrasting it
with the wider “lawyer,” for which there is no single Latin term.
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Then there is the problem of our sources. The one attempt at historical
treatment, Sextus Pomponius’ Enchiridion, is distinctly muddled, whether by
the original author or by later misunderstanding, and is by no means
reliable.4 Marcus Tullius Cicero, naturally, was interested in the legal world
in which he played a significant part, but he was not particularly interested in
the earlier period, and he died in 43 B.C. Law and lawyers were not topics
that interested the literary class, so they are as such barely mentioned by the
Roman historians. The compilers of the Digest of Roman Law were ordered
to select and edit the works of all the prudentes of old to whom the emperors
had granted authority to compose and interpret the laws, and to ignore books
written by others whose writings had not been received or used by any later
authors.5 The latter instruction seems to have been obeyed for, while there
are jurists cited in the Digest of whom we know nothing more than these
texts and their names, there are no references anywhere to other jurists of the
Principate. As to the former order, Republican jurists can hardly have been
authorized by emperors, and not all the cited jurists of the Empire can have
been so empowered.
Whether in or as from the Twelve Tables of 451–450 B.C., it is the
uncontested tradition that a member of the college of pontiffs, all then
patricians, was appointed each year to be in charge of private matters, that is,
to interpret private law.6 This was logical because early private law was
largely concerned with the family and inheritance, and overlapped with the
sacral law in these areas. The pontiffs were not priests in the mysteryreligion sense, but were responsible for proper rituals; they were at the same
time able to engage in the business of the Senate and hold magistracies, and
as such they might also be concerned with public law. Pontifical status
seems sufficient to explain their authority, and why no need was seen to
make this authority formal. The fact that they were a college meant that
debate was possible in new or doubtful cases. The link between the pontiffs
and the interpretation of law, although no longer absolute, lasted until well
into the third century B.C.7
Around 200 B.C. Roman history becomes less remote. Literary sources,
such as the plays of Plautus and the agricultural works of Cato and Varro
survive from that time. The first jurist whose work has survived, Sextus
Aelius Paetus, was consul in 198 B,C. The chief legal figures of the second
century were Manlius Manilius, consul in 149 B.C.; M. Junius Brutus,
praetor in 142; and Publius Mucius Scaevola, consul in 133. A generation
later came P. Rutilius Rufus, consul in 105 B.C.; and Quintus Mucius
4
5
6
7

DIG. 1.2.2.35–.53 (Pomponius, lib. sing. eniridii).
CONST. DEO AUCTORE § 4.
DIG. 1.2.2.5.
JOLOWICZ & NICHOLAS, supra note 2, at 88–91.

2013]

LAWYERS AND JURISTS

713

Scaevola, son of Publius, consul in 95. We then come to Cicero and his
generation. Leading figures were C. Aquillius Gallus, of equestrian family,
praetor with Cicero in 66 B.C.; Servius Sulpicius Rufus, consul in 51, friend
of Caesar; A. Ofilius, a lifelong eques and another friend of Caesar; A.
Cascellius, born an eques but in office as quaestor before 73 B.C.; C.
Trebatius Testa, protegé of Cicero and friend of Caesar and made an eques
by Augustus who consulted him on codicils; Q. Aelius Tubero, a Pompeian
senator reconciled with Caesar; and P. Alfenus Varus, consul in 39 B.C. It is
notable that most of this last group were born into equestrian, not senatorial,
status, even Servius Sulpicius Rufus.8
Even with the advantage of Cicero’s evidence, romanists such as Schulz,
Kunkel, and Jolowicz have managed to list remarkably few names for the
180 or so years of the period before Labeo, who lived under and disagreed
with Augustus’ supremacy. Schulz has c. 46 names dating from Aelius
Paetus,9 and Kunkel has 36 from Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the augur, consul
in 117 B.C.;10 the numbers are vague because dates are uncertain. These
numbers may be further skewed as some of those identified as jurists should
be classed primarily as orators, while others are very obscure.
Is this a sufficient number of jurists to do all the development work of
Late Republican Roman law, remembering that civil wars occupied much
time? If not, where are we to look for other creators and interpreters of the
law?
The obvious place is among the scribes.11 As Schulz pointed out, “the
aristocrat has in general little inclination for routine work.” The pontiffs and
magistrates were supported by a subordinate staff of secretaries and copyists.
“Sometimes these secretaries styled themselves jurists, and quite rightly.
Their contributions remain unrecorded . . . but we should at least remember
their existence.”12 Scribes seem to have been free-born, and often of some
social standing; they formed an ordo, which Cicero treated respectfully.13 G.
Cicereius, praetor in 173 B,C,, started his public career as a scriba.14 Status
varied among the scribes themselves, but the quaestorian scribes, who served
the same higher magistracies as the quaestors, might well become
8
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equestrians, and hold prefectures. Pontifical scribes were classed as minor
pontiffs.15 An undated inscription records “. . . nus iuris prudens scr[iba]
aed[ilium] cur[ulium] v[ixit] a[nnis] LIIII.”16
Badian reconstructs
convincingly the career of Q. Cornelius, who was scriba under Sulla and
then quaestor under Julius Caesar, and was also described as pontifex minor;
he is to be identified with the teacher and friend of C. Trebatius Testa.17
Schiller argues that “most of the jurists [in the Late Republic] were of
equestrian rank.”18 The senior scribae were men who knew their law and the
intricacies of its practice and administration. Their status permitted
friendship with senators.19
Cicero, speaking through the orator Antonius, required that, for someone
to be named a iuris consultus, he should have knowledge of the laws and
custom used by citizens in their private affairs, and be skilled in giving legal
opinions,20 in appearing in court, and in the drafting of legal forms for such
things as wills or contracts21 (ad respondendum et ad agendum et ad
cavendum).22 However, during the second century B.C. specialist orators
largely replaced the lawyers as advocates, although it is to be remembered
that for the Romans tertiary education was rhetoric, and the gap between
lawyers and orators was never an abyss. Furthermore, advice on drafting
wills or contracts may have become less important as models were
established and then published in writing. The giving of opinions remained
the quintessential function of the man skilled in law. Teaching in this period
was incidental, by apprenticeship as audience and follower.23
It seems likely that in the archaic period, that is roughly before 200 B.C.,
Roman society was small enough for clientage to be the normal route for a
small man to get legal aid and advice from a specialist. Great men were
expected to provide such advice, at any level of technicality, whenever they
could be accosted, as part of their noblesse oblige. Of course it also won
15
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gratia, favour, a most important component of Roman Republican political
life, where money was not requested but obligations were planted.
But as Rome grew, there must have been many more seeking aid and
advice, and the great men were becoming more involved in their own power
struggles. It seems likely that for many matters, for many people, consulting
the scribae would satisfy their legal needs; moreover, through their very
jobs, the scribae gave advice to magistrates. The scribae were essentially
based in Rome, and as a permanent body, with written resources, were in a
good position to provide model documents and formulae. Indeed, there is no
reason to doubt that they produced some legal books, since the use of vicarii
or deputies would give them the time to write.
With the coming of the Principate, Augustus took pains to ‘restore the
Republic’ as far as externals went; nevertheless, as he himself stated, his
auctoritas, his effective authority, was pre-eminent. Kunkel argued that
Augustus wished to restore the prestige of the lawyers.24 I see no reason to
follow Kunkel’s view, for why should Augustus bother when it was not a
governmental issue? However, there was a gap to be filled, something to
replace the political ambitions of senators when in Rome. Law was a
respectable and traditional way to keep in the public eye, to preserve social
esteem. This is sufficient to explain why senatorials seem to dominate the
legal scene in the early Principate. This was to change under the Flavians, at
a time when emperors came to rely less on their own private families of
slaves and freedmen and more on men born into the equestrian class to run
their administration with (not for) them. Equestrian status was no bar to
serving on the imperial consilium; examples are Ulpius Marcellus,
Tryphoninus, Arrius Menander. Permanent offices were established, based
on function rather than functionaries, and in particular, for legal purposes,
the offices of the a libellis, the a memoria, and the a cognitionibus. Papinian
and Ulpian were each chiefs of the a libellis, on their routes to the Praetorian
Prefecture. Furthermore, we hear of salaried adsessores, consiliarii, studiosi
iuris, men clearly of some legal expertise, and often, it seems likely, holding
such offices as part of a career pattern, almost as training grades. Papinian
was adsessor to the Praetorian Prefect, as was Ulpian, and also Paul, who
became chief of the a memoria.25
Now, there were some sixty-four jurists listed for the 250 years or so from
Labeo to Modestinus;26 it is surely possible to add the office chiefs, and
maybe their immediate deputies. I think one may safely give them an
average career of at least twenty years. This gives a distinctly better ratio of
24
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men to years than the Republican period, particularly if one takes the figures
Lenel gives for Republican jurists;27 moreover, it was a more peaceful time.
It seems likely that we do have an approximate idea of the numbers of
imperial jurists, and that there will always have been at least half a dozen
around at any time, enough for ideas to be debated. Jurists as we know them
were steadily brought into the imperial service, but their standing as jurists
seems always to have depended on peer esteem. When they lost that
independence, they cease to be called jurists, however much they were
fulfilling the same functions. It is surely significant that, although we know
nothing of the careers of Plautius, Pomponius, Venuleius Saturninus, Gaius,
Papirius Justus, Florentinus, Callistratus, and Tertullian (since I do not accept
that he was identical with the theologian), they were cited by their fellows,
with the exception of Gaius.
The final issue I wish to consider in this rapid survey of the identity and
role of jurists is a particular aspect of their authority. This is a problem
raised by the case of Sabinus, a celebrated jurist who survived into the reign
of Nero.28 Pomponius stated that “Massurius Sabinus was of equestrian
rank, and he first gave opinions on behalf of the public. For after this
privilege came to be granted, it was conceded to him by Tiberius Caesar.”29
“To Sabinus the concession was granted by Tiberius Caesar that he might
give opinions to the people at large. He was admitted to the equestrian rank
when already of mature years, almost 50. He never had substantial means,
but for the most part was supported by his pupils.”30 The repetition is clearly
an example of Pomponius’ muddled exposition, but what it says is quite
clear: Tiberius gave Sabinus a special privilege. Raising men to equestrian
rank as adults was certainly not unknown, for example Trebatius Testa.
Living off one’s students was not disgraceful, although it might imply
worldly incompetence. If this is all we had, we might well think it
comparable to the double salary awarded to Julian in his quaestorship by
Hadrian.31 And indeed this is what I do think.32
However, the waters have been very thoroughly muddied for generations
of romanists by the intermediate sentence in Pomponius’ account:
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To clarify the point in passing, before the time of Augustus the
right of stating opinions at large was not granted by emperors,
but the practice was that opinions were given by people who
had confidence in their own studies. Nor did they always issue
opinions under seal, but most commonly wrote themselves to
the judges or gave the testimony of a direct answer to those
who consulted them. It was the deified Augustus who, in order
to enhance the authority of the law, first established that
opinions might be given under his authority. And from that
time this began to be sought as a favor. As a consequence of
this, our most excellent emperor Hadrian issued a rescript on an
occasion when some men of praetorian rank were petitioning
him for permission to grant opinions; he said that this was by
custom not just begged for but earned, and that he would
accordingly be delighted if whoever had faith in himself would
prepare himself for giving opinions to the people at large.33
Was there ever a ius respondendi, publice or otherwise? Our sole
evidence is this corrupt text from Pomponius. The only other direct classical
comment on juristic authority comes from Gaius:
The opinions of the jurists are the views and advice of those to
whom it has been permitted to build up the law. If all their
opinions agree, then what is so held has the force of law, but if
they disagree, the judge may follow whichever view he wishes;
and Hadrian indicated this in a rescript.34
The only crux is the force of “permitted”; does it have to mean imperial
grant? Or is it simply imperial leave to carry on in the ordinary way?
Otherwise Gaius is simply saying that jurisprudence is a source of law.
Justinian, as already mentioned,35 seems to have believed that jurists must be
specifically authorized to give responsa, but there are in the Digest plentiful
texts from both Pomponius and Gaius, who did not, according to many
modern romanists, issue responsa.
Some have argued that the so-called ius respondendi means that Augustus
gave certain jurists binding authority in their opinions. This is hardly
possible; neither Augustus nor Tiberius was blatant in his use of power, and
this would have been a huge break with Republican practice. And to what
end? Secondly, even if it was some sort of official approval, which would
33
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indeed be likely to enhance the authority of a particular jurist, why do we
never get any reference to it in the juristic writings? Jurists quote each other
frequently enough, and they clearly had full freedom to disagree with each
other. Linked with this is the point that certain issues had remained
undecided until Justinian’s own day, technical issues such as whether a
legacy with an impossible condition should be held invalid, or the condition
struck out;36 this and other matters, as Gaius shows, remained in dispute.
Thirdly, we have the full and clear inscription recording Julian’s career (cited
above), and there is no mention of any such privilege. This is negative
evidence, and it is just possible that there was some privilege for jurists
which was abolished by Hadrian and so not mentioned in the inscription, but
Schulz is probably right in saying that if Hadrian had done something so
specific we should have some record. In Schulz’s eyes “A ius respondendi
existed no more than a right to breathe.”37
If, as I have been arguing, our concept of “jurist” in the Later Republic is
inflated, if equestrians, and men below that rank, had such a considerable
role in making law, what was so special about Sabinus? And really special,
because the only other text which can remotely be held as an explicit
reference to a ius respondendi is the Greek passage cited by Schulz, which
refers to a certain Innocentius of the time of Diocletian.38 Sabinus must have
been given some special authority, of which the precise nature must remain
unknown, perhaps because he had done some favor for Tiberius, but more
likely in connection with his work as the head of one of the Schools. Indeed,
a ius respondendi existed no more than a right to breathe.
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